The effects of financial innovations on checkable deposits, M1 and M2 by John A. Tatom
John A. Tatom
John A. Tatom is an assistant vice president at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Kevin L. Kilesen provided research
assistance.
The Effects of Financial
Innovations on Checkable
Deposits, Ml and M2
IL? URING THE EARLY 1980s, several new
types of financial assets were authorized by
Congress and included in the definitions of
various monetary aggregates. The principal
new accounts were NOW accounts, which
were authorized nationwide in January 1981,
and money-market deposit and super-NOW ac-
counts, which became available in Uecember
1982 and January 1983, respectively. Their
growth and inclusion in monetary aggregates
gave rise to increased uncertainty in explaining
movements in the monetary aggregates and
questions about the relationship of the mone-
1These uncertainties have been a continuing source of con-
cern for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
This concern has focused primarily on Ml - See Hafer
(1986) and Nuetzel (1987) for discussions of uncertainties
associated with Ml. In 1981, when the authority to offer
interest-bearing checkable deposits was extended nation-
wide, the FOMC announced targets for the old MI-type
measure that excluded such new deposits and for an
Ml-type measure that added these so-called other
checkable deposits. See Tatom (1982) and Thornton
(1982) for an analysis of the 1981 developments and their
effects on monetary policy; the latter article discusses the
evolution of the current MI measure following the 1980
redefinitions discussed in Hater (1980). ln 1983, the FOMC
refrained from targeting on Ml and indicated a greater
reliance on M2. See Hafer (1985) for a discussion of the
effects of 1983 innovations on policy deliberations.
Mascaro and Marlow (1989), Friedman (1988), Haraf
(1986), Hetzel (1989), Hetzel and Mehra (1989), Judd and
Trehan (1987), Judd, Motley and Trehan (1988), Keeley
and Zimmerman (1986), Kopcke (1987), Porter and Offen-
bacher (1984), Mehra (1989), Roth (1987), Siegel (1986),
Simpson (1984) and Wenninger (1986). In short, this view
is widespread. Earlier studies disputing these claims in-
clude Cook and Rowe (1986), Gavin (1987), Hem (1982),
Jordan (1984) and Tatom (1982, 1983a, 1983b). These
studies follow an earlier theoretical and empirical tradition
which suggested the ineffectiveness of deposit rate regula-
tions. This literature includes such works as Barro and
Santomero (1972), Bradley and Jansen (1988), Cox (1986),
Frodin and Startz (1982), Kareken (1967), Benjamin Klein
(1970, 1974), Michael Klein (1974), Saving (1971, 1977,
and 1979), Santomero (1974). Startz (1979) and Tatom
(1971).
tary aggregates to various measures of econom-
ic performance.1
The widely accepted view is that these finan-
cial innovations have rendered Ml less useful,
or even useless, as a monetary policy target.2
The related view—that the broader aggregate
M2 has been unaffected by these innovations
and therefore remains a useful target—is almost
as widely shared. While an apparent change in
the linkage between Ml and economic perfor-
mance in the 1980s has buttressed the impres-
sion that financial innovations distorted Ml and
2Some examples are: Hater (1984), Barnett (1982), Spindt
(1985), Morris (l982), Ccx and Rosenblum (1989), Darby,impaired its usefulness) few quantitative studies
have assessed the actual effects of financial in-
novations on the monetary aggregates.
This paper first describes the financial innova-
tions hypothesis that Ml, but not M2, has been
significantly affected by the introduction and
growth of these new assets. It then assesses the
validity of this hypothesis by examining whether
the turnover rate for checkable deposits, cur-
rency preferences, and Ml and M2 demand




Table 1 shows the components of Ml and M2
in 1989. Ml consists of currency in the hands
of the public, demand deposits, other checkable
deposits and travelers checks. Other checkable
deposits include accounts on which financial in-
stitutions can make explicit interest payments.
During the 1970s, a few states authorized in-
terest-paying negotiable order of withdrawal
(NOW) accounts. In 1978, checkable accounts
with automatic transfer from interest-paying
savings accounts (ATS) were authorized by the
Federal Reserve System.
As figure 1 shows, the share of other check-
able deposits in total checkable deposits (demand
and other checkable deposits) rose from about
10 percent in late 1980 to more than 25 percent
by the end of 1981, the first year that nation-
wide NOW accounts were authorized. This share
continued to rise, in part because of the intro-
duction of super-NOW accounts (interest-bearing
other checkable deposits with unregulated inter-
est rates) in early 1983. By 1989, other check-
able deposits had risen to $278.5 billion, nearly
half of total checkable deposits and about 36
percent of Ml.
M2 is the sum of Ml, saving and small time
deposits at all financial institutions, overnight
(and continuing contract) repurchase agreements
issued by all commercial banks, overnight Eurodol-
lars issued to U.S. residents by foreign branches
of U.S. banks and money market accounts (MM),
Table 1
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‘Geneal purpose and b~okor.deaIerfunds.
‘Eurodollar aoposils issued to U S. residents by tore’qn
oranches of U.S. oarlks.
3Componerts 00 -lot add 10 total because o’ round-ng.
which include both general 1~tposeand broker-
dealer money market mutual funds (MMMF) and
money market deposit accounts (MMDA). Money
market deposit accounts, which have unregu-
lated interest rates, were authorized at the same
time as supei-NOW accounts and became avail-
able in December 1982. Within the first two
quarters of 1983, they had grown to 17 percent
of M2 (figure 2). Some of this growth apparently
came at the expense of money market mutual
fund accounts, since the total share of money
market accounts, MMDA and MMMF, rose by
less than 17 percentage points; the share of
total money market balances, rose from 10 per-
cent to about 24 percent of M2 at the time.
Since there is little difference between MMDAs
and MMMFs, which became available in 1978,
they are grouped together here as money mar-
ket accounts. The share of I~1Min M2, called
s22 below, rose to nearly 25 percent of M2 by
1989 (see table 1 and figure 2).
‘Numerous other financial innovations have occurred over
the past several decades. This article focuses solely on
the introduction of the principal new types of monetary
assets that are included in the monetary aggregates.
Moreover, the analysis is limited solely to the effects of
these innovations on Ml and M2; it ignores the effects on
broader aggregates or on differently weighted aggregates,
like the divisia or turnover-weighted aggregates. These
other measures are discussed by Barnett (1982) and
Spindt (1985).Figure 1
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1989The financial innovations hypothesis described
here focuses primarily on the effects of the
growth of these new assets on Ml. According to
this hypothesis, the introduction of interest-
bearing checking accounts made depositors
more willing to hold savings balances in their
checking instead of their savings accounts.
Thus, the growth of other checkable deposits,
especially nationwide NOW accounts in 1981
and super-NOW accounts in 1983, was expected
to boost total checkable deposits and Ml and
raise the interest elasticities of their demand&’
In addition, movements of funds from savings
to checkable deposits were expected to take
place among components of M2, so that the
total demand for M2 was unaffected by shifts to
other checkable deposits. Similarly, the shift of
funds into MMDAs was expected to flow from
other components of M2, especially MMMFs;
thus, the expansion of MMDAs was not ex-
pected to boost M2’ One implication of this
hypothesis is that the growth of MMDAs, or of
MMMFs earlier, did not affect the demand for
Ml, its use or its coinposition.~If these assets
provide transaction services that are substitutes
for total checkable deposits, however, then
shifts to these balances should reduce the de-
mand for total checkable deposits relative to
currency holdings, or raise the currency ratio.
Such shifts would also reduce the overall de-
mand for Ml. Whethet- money market innova-
tions had any significant effects is also tested
below.
The surge in the share of MMs in M2 in early
1983 %vas associated with a sharp rise in M2
growth from a 9.1 percent rise in the four
quarters of 1982 to a 16.6 percent annual rate
in the first half of 1983. While this movement
ran counter to the financial innovations hypo-
thesis, many thought that it was transitory and
carried little implication for future economic
performance.~
In this article, the financial innovations hypo-
thesis is tested by examining whether these new
assets have influenced the use, composition or
demand for total checkable deposits, Mi and
M2 as predicted. If total checkable deposits and
Ml are boosted by inflows of savings into other
checkable deposits, then the total checkable
deposit turnover rate—the ratio of debits on
total checkable deposits to total checkable de-
posits—should be inversely related to the share
of other checkable deposits in total checkable
deposits (Si = OCD/TCD). Similarly, the desired
ratio of the currency component of Ml to the
total checkable deposit component also should
be inversely related to si.8
When the effects of other checkable deposits
on Ml and M2 are investigated, the innovations
measures used are their ratios to Ml (sli =
OCD/M1) and to M2 (s12 OCD/M2), respectively.
If Ml is increased by an inflow of savings into
other checkable deposits, then the demand for
Ml, given its other determinants, must be posi-
tively related to si1- According to the financial
innovations hypothesis, the impact of money
market balances, measured relative to Ml (s21 =
MM/MI), on Ml demand is zero. Similarly, if the
hypothesis is correct, the demand for M2 should
4Rasche (1 988a) cites several studies which argue that
financial innovations lowered the interest elasticity of
money demand. More recent proponents of a financial in-
novations effect argue for an increase in this elasticity.
Rasche (1987, 1988a and l988b) has provided evidence
for a rise in the interest elasticity of Ml demand, but he
does not link this to financial innovations. Friedman (1988),
Moore, Porter and Small (1988), Carlson (1989), Mehra
(19891 and Poole (1988~also have pointed to the rise in
the interest elasticity of Ml demand, although for different
reasons. The first four studies suggest that this effect
arose from financial innovations, while Poole suggests that
it is not a recent development; instead, only its recognition
is recent.
5See Thornton (1983). In late 1982, the FOMC anticipated
that maturing all-savers certificates and the impending in-
troduction of MMDAS would temporarily boost Ml and, to
a iesser extent, M2. The FOMC decided in October 1982
to set no short-run objective for MI, but to place greater
weight on M2. There was no indication that M2 would rise
relative to Ml, especially by as much as it did.
6Some analysts, however, point to the similarities between
super-NOW and money market accounts; the latter offer
limited checking services and unregulated interest rates.
They suggest that money market balances are close
substitutes for Ml. See Cox and Flosenblum (1989) and
Motley (1988), for example.
7For example, the FOMC’s initial target range for M2 an-
nounced in February 1983 called for M2 growth in the
7-to-lO-percent range from the February-March average to
the fourth quarter of 1983. This range was viewed as com-
parable to the 1982 range of 6 to 9 percent, allowing for a
further boost to M2 due to new MMDAs. Hafer (1985)
discusses these developments and their effects on the
FOMC deliberations in detail.
5The appendix to this article presents a more formal discus-
sion ofthe tests of the effects of financial innovations,41
be unrelated both to other checkable deposits,
measured by s12, and to money market bal-
ances, measured by s22.
Testing ‘01’ a Sh.i/’t I the .hiterest
Bate Blastjeit
The effect of other checkable deposits on the
interest elasticity of each relationship also is ex-
amined. The financial innovations hypothesis in-
dicates that the weighted average cost of holdS
ing total checkable deposits and Mi and the in-
terest elasticity of various monetary linkages are
functions of the relative size of other checkable
deposit balances. The implication is that the
relevant interest elasticity rose, on average, after
the introduction of other checkable deposits.
Under the financial innovations hypothesis, the
rise in the interest elasticity is a function of si,
the relative size of other checkable deposits.
Thus, if /3, is the interest elasticity before the
introduction of other checkable deposits (that is,
when si is zero), then following this innovation
the interest elasticity becomes /3* =J3~+j3,si.
In the log-linear relationships estimated below,
the interest elasticity foliowing the advent of
other checkable deposits is found from the /3
coefficients in the expression: fi~ Ini + j31(sl InO;
the interest elasticity is /3~ plus /3 weighted
(multiplied) by the average value of si. In a
first-difference equation, the appropriate expres-
sion is: /3~Alni + /3, A(sl Ini). Whether the in-
terest elasticity has increased as a result of this
financial innovation is indicated by the sign and
statistical significance of ~
In summary, in this study the financial in-
novations hypothesis is rejected if: (1) measures
of other checkable deposit innovations have no
significant effect on the Mi-related variables
and their interest elasticities, (2) these same
measures have a significant effect on the size or
interest elasticity of M2 demand, or (3) mea-
sures of money market innovations have any
significant effect on the use, composition or de-
mand for Mi or the demand for M2. These re-
lationships are examined below.
•FII’JANC1AL INNoVATIONS. ‘INI)
THE DEPOSIT TURNOVER. RATE
The turnover of other checkable deposits,
their debits per dollar of deposits, is lower than
the turnover of demand deposits. For example,
in May 1989, the annual rate of debits per dol-
lar of demand deposits at banks outside New
York (where demand deposit turnover is nearly
seven times larger) was 467.5; turnover on ATS
and NOW accounts at commercial banks was
only 18.2 times per year, much closer to the 3.6
rate on savings deposits at commercial banks.9
The similarity between the turnover of ATS and
NOW balances and that on saving deposits is
sometimes taken as evidence to support the
financial innovations hypothesis.
The hypothesis says that other checkable de-
posits include balances that would have been
held in savings or other non-Mi balances before
interest-bearing checking accounts became avail-
able. As these savings flowed into other check-
able deposits, the turnover of total checkable
deposits should have fallen, and its interest elas~
ticity should have been altered.
Figure 3 shows the natural logarithms of the
turnover rate for demand deposits and total
checkable deposits (demand, ATS and NOW
balances) since 1970. Turnover has a strong up-
ward trend; for example, the turnover rate of
demand deposits more than doubled from 1970
to early 1979. The two measures began to de-
viate in late 1978, when ATS accounts were in-
troduced, reflecting the lower turnover rates
for ATS and NOW balances. The upward surge
of demand deposit turnover, especially in 1981,
suggests that lower turnover deposits were
switched from demand deposits to the new ac-
counts. More important, however, the turnover
rate for total checkable deposits rose in 1981,
counter to the decline predicted by the financial
innovations hypothesis. Overall, the turnover
rate for total checkable deposits looks more like
a continuation of the 1970-78 demand deposit
turnover series than does the demand deposit
turnover series itself.
~These data are available in the Federal Reserve statistical
release, 0.6, Debits and Deposit turnover at Commercial
Banks. Debits on ATS and NOW accounts, like those on
demand deposits, typically are third party payments; debits
on savings, on the other hand, typically are in-bank
withdrawals, Moreover, deposit turnover is substantially
larger for business accounts than individuals; only the lat-
ter, however, can legally hold NOW and ATS accounts.4)
Figure 3
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Deposit turnover measures are velocity mea-
sures; as such, they are related to the same fac-
tors, like interest rates and income, that influ-
ence the demand for money. Higher interest
rates, by increasing the cost of holding check-
able deposits, should reduce the quantity of
these deposits demanded and increase their
turnover rates. As income rises, the demand for
these deposits should rise; whether the turn-
over rate rises or falls, however, depends on
whether debits rise more or less than the de-
mand for checkable deposits. The continuous
annualized growth rate of monthly total check-
able deposit turnover, CDT, was estimated as a
function of the continuous annualized rates of
increase of the three-month Treasury bill rate,
H, and real personal income, y, for the period
January 1979 to January 1989.
The financial innovations hypothesis indicates
(1) that a rise in sl should significantly reduce
the turnover of total checkable deposits and (2)
that a rise in money market balances, measured
here by a rise in the ratio of money market
balances to total checkable deposits, s2, should
not affect it. This was tested by adding current
and up to 12 lagged values of the annualized
first~differencesof si and s2, labeled Dsl and
Ds2, respectively, to the turnover equation; ad-
ding lagged effects beyond one month, how-
ever, was uniformly unnecessary.
Tt’he estimate for total checkable deposit turn-
over that contains the most statistically signifi-
cant innovations term is:
(1) CDT,= 13.00 — 0.043R, + 0.1l0n,~,
(5.22) (—1.36) (3.62)




= 0.244 D.W. = 2.00
(2.80) (2.68)
fl2 = 0.15 SE. = 29.255
(‘rhe numbers in parentheses in the equation
estimates reported here are t-statistics.)
The results in equation 1 show that the share
of other checkable deposits has not significantly
depressed the turnover of checkable deposits;







statisticaliy insignificant.’°This result is counter
to the financial innovations hypothesis.
If financial innovations increased the interest
elasticity of total checkable deposits turnover,
then the coefficients on the interest rate terms
(H,, H,.,) in equation 1 should be related to si.
To test whether these coefficients have increas-
ed with the rise of the share of other checkable
deposits in total checkable deposits, the an-
nualized change in the product (SI lnR) for the
current and past month are added to equation 1.
The sum of these coefficients is positive, 0.03, but
it provides no significant explanatory power to
the equation. The F-statistic for testing whether
these coefficients are zero is F,,,,, = 0.04, well
below the critical value (5 percent) of 3.08.
Thus, financial innovations, as defined here,
have had no significant effect on the interest
elasticity of total checkable deposit turnover.
Again, this result is counter to the financial in-
novations hypothesis.
I~INANCIAL INNOVATIONS BAlD
pisIi~ CURRENCY-DEPOSH’ H .3rv’~•(
The currency ratio, the ratio of currency held
by the public to its total checkable deposits, is a
principal determinant of the money multiplier
(the ratio of a monetary aggregate to the ad-
justed monetary base). Moreover, it is the prin-
cipal channel through which financial innova-
tions can affect the link between Federal He-
serve actions and the monetary aggregates.”
The desired ratio of currency to total checkable
deposits is the outcome of a portfolio decision
based on the relative costs and benefits of
holding each means of payment. If total check-
able deposits now include a larger component
of savings balances than they did earlier, then
the increase in the share of other checkable
deposits in total checkable deposits should have
lowered the currency ratio. In addition, if money
market accounts are a substitute for checkable
deposits included in Ml, then the introduction
and spread of money market holdings should
have reduced total checkable deposits relative to
currency holdings and raised the currency ra-
tth.’~According to the financial innovations hy-
pothesis outlined above, however, this latter ef-
fect should be zero.
Figure 4 shows quarterly data on the ratio of
the currency and the checkable deposit com-
ponents of Ml - This ratio does not decline in
early 1981 or early 1983 when the largest boosts
in savings held in other checkable deposits pre-
sumably would have occurred. Nor does the
currency ratio rise in early 1983 when money
market accounts surged.
A modified time series model is used to test
the effects of these shifts on the currency ratio.
The growth rate of the currency ratio can be
described as a first-order autoregressive time
10Either the current or first-lagged value of Dsl is strongly
and positively statistically significant when added to an
identical equation for demand deposit turnover growth.
When both current and lagged Dsl values are included,
however, neither is statistically significant. The standard
error of the estimate is lower when the current value is us-
ed instead of the lagged value. The coefficient on the cur-
rent value is 1.025 (t=3.49). The result in equation 1 is
unaffected by regressing the growth rate of total debits on
the same right-hand-side variables and on the growth rate
of total checkable deposits; the coefficient on Dsl,, is
0.282 (t=0.95) in this case. Finally, when equation 11 in
the appendix is estimated using the nonlinear least
squares method, neither f nor gd is significantly different
from zero. The estimates off and gO are 0.005 (t’~0.0i)
and 0.021 (t=0.37), respectively.
The turnover rate for deposits, excluding demand
deposits in New York (and their debits) was also examin-
ed, Its growth rate is white noise and is independent of in-
terest rates or real personal income. It is also not signifi-
cantly correlated with the current or lagged values of the
changes in the financial innovation shares. For example,
the correlation coefficient for the growth rate of turnover of
total checkable deposits, excluding New York demand
deposits, and the first lagged change in sl is 0.023. This
insignificnat correlation rejects the implication of the finan-
cial innovations hypothesis that this correlation is
significantly negative.
11The adjusted monetary base is described in Gilbert (1980
and 1987). A recent analysis of lhe behavior ofthe
multiplier and its determinants can be found in Burger
(1988).
l2The effect of nationwide NOW accounts on the currency
ratio is tested in Tatom (1982). A model of the demand for
currency and demand deposits is used to test whether
other checkable deposits lowered desired currency
holdings relative to total checkable deposits. The tests re-
ject the financial innovations hypothesis. Rasche and
Johannes (1987) show that the 1981 shift to NOW ac-
counts included a shift of savings to these accounts equal
to about the 27.5 percent of such funds in the first four
months of 1981. While this proportion also was suggested
by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board, they suggested
that it would have a continuing effect and applied it for all
of 1981. Rasche and Johannes, on the other hand, argue
that this shift significantly, but only temporarily, reduced
the currency ratio and raised the money multiplier. They
find no evidence that the shift to other checkable deposits
or money market accounts had a permanent effect on the
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series process; two other factors also have had
a major impact on the currency ratio over the
past 15 years and they are controlled for in the
following estimates.’3 The first factor is energy
prices, which rose sharply in 1973-74 and in
1979-81 and fell sharply in 1986. A rise in ener-
gy prices raises expenditures that use currency
relatively more than it raises expenditures that
rely more heavily on checkable deposits. Thus,
the currency ratio rises when energy prices in~
crease.’4 The second factor is the transitory ef-
fect of the credit control program in 1980,
which temporarily boosted currency demand
relative to checkable deposits in the second
quarter of the year. Credit limitations increase
the use of currency, especially in transactions
that would otherwise be facilitated by retail
credit.’~Finally, the current and past quarter’s
three.month T-bill rates are included to examine
the interest rate elasticity of the currency ratio;
longer lags for the interest rate variables are
not statistically significant.
The model of the currency ratio, k, estimated
for the period 111/1959 to IV/1989 is shown in
the first column of table 2. The dependent vari-
able, k,, is the annualized continuous rate of
growth of the currency ratio. The annualized
“Rasche and Johannes (1987) argue for the superiority of a
time series model over a structural approach like that used
in Tatom (1982); the modifications here are made to in-
clude the sizable known effects of the two energy price
shocks and to test whether the currency ratio’s interest
elasticity was affected.
‘4Tatom (1985) provides evidence that money demand is af-
fected by energy price increases. The currency-ratio effect
may arise, at least in part, through gasoline purchases
that affect currency demand more than the demand for
checkable deposits. A related argument is that a change
in the mix of personal consumption expenditures toward
nondurable purchases raises the currency ratio. See
Dotsey (1988).
‘5The effect of the credit control program on the money
stock is discussed in Tatom (1982) and Hem (1982). Also
see Wallace (1980) for an analysis of the effects of credit





4~ ,,corn,,r 04 nOcontinuous rate of increase of the relative price
of energy resources, is’, is measured by the
ratio of the producer price index for fuel, pow-
er and related products to the implicit price
deflator for business sector output. The credit-
control variable, D80, equals one in the second
quarter of 1980, negative one in the third quar-
ter of 1980, and zero otherwise. These indepen-
dent variables are generally strongly statistically
significant in the estimates shown in table 2.16
When current and lagged (up to four) values
of Dsl or Ds2 were added to the model, only
the estimate with the current-quarter change in
sI (Dsl), shows a statistically significant innova-
tions effect; it is reported in the second column
of table 2. Although, the negative coefficient on
Dsl, is not statistically significant at a 5 percent
level in a two-tail test, it is significantly negative
using a one-tail test of the negative effect pre-
dicted by the hypothesis.’~No other individual
or group of current or lagged changes of the
financial innovations variables are as signifi-
cant.’8 These results suggest that growth in
other checkable deposits has significantly low.
ered the currency ratio, which is consistent
with the financial innovations hypothesis.’~
This effect is weak, however, and is quite sen-
sitive to the exclusion of only one observation—
the second quarter of 1981. When this quarter
is omitted, the coefficient on Dsl falls in ab-
solute value to —0.073, and its t~statisticfalls to
—0.89, which is far from statistical significance
even with a one-tail test. Thus, the significant
result for Dsl, in table 2 is spurious. The largest
rise in the si measure occurs in 1/1981 not in
the second quarter; the omission of the 1/1981
observation, however, does not affect the signif-
icance of D51. The decline in the significance of
Dsl when the 11/1981 observation is omitted
Table 2
Tests for the Ratio of Currency to Total
Checkable Deposits (k)
Dependent Variable: 400Alnk
Period: 111/1959 to tV/1989
Constant 0.496 0.750 0.419
(‘I 70) (2.321 (1.37)
0 503 0 477 0.503
(7.28~ ~6.81) ~7201
R 0.013 0.011 0.014
(195) (175) (202)










D(sl lnR~ ) 0.037
(1 30)
R 055 056 0.55
SE 3052 3023 3054
D.W 2.11 2.10 2.13
h -101 —092 —1.20
‘°TheF-statistic for a Chow test of the stability of the equa-
tion using the first and second half of the whole sample
period is F,,,1
= 0.64, well below the 5 percent critical
value of 2.30. Thus, the stability of the currency ratio
estimate cannot be rejected.
17In earlier versions of this article, this effect was insignifi-
cant even with a one-tail test. For example, before the
February 1990 benchmark revisions, the estimate for the
period lll/1959 to 111/1989 had a coefficient of
— 0.101 (t = —1.24). The critical t-statistic value for a one-
tail test is about 1.65. The significance of the rest of the
results reported here was not so affected. The nonlinear
least-squares estimate of equation 17 in the appendix
(when g equals zero) yields essentially the same result as
in the text; in particular, the point estimate off is 0.1324
(t = 1.83). The g parameter is set equal to zero in this
estimate because it is not significantly different from zero
‘8For example, the coefficient on Ds2 is 0.013 when added
to the equation in the first column, and its t-statistic is only
1.19.
‘9Although Rasche and Johannes find a significant transitory
decline in the currency ratio in early 1981, this is not
found in the error in either the first or second quarter of
1981 for the first equation in table 2. This difference may
arise because they use monthly, seasonally unadjusted
data, while seasonally adjusted quarterly data are used
here. In the form estimated, their four-month long reduc-
tion corresponds to one observation here, The tests here
cannot readily determine whether such a brief transitory
effect of financial innovations took place.
when freely estimated.does not occur from a decline in the variance of
Dsl; the standard deviation of Psi rises from
0.076 to 0.082 when the 11/1981 observation is
omitted. The significant result in table 2 arises
from a spurious decline in the currency ratio in
11/1981, when sl growth was relatively large.
The third column in table 2 examines whether
the interest elasticity of the desired currency
ratio increased in absolute value as a result of
financial innovations. The results show a posi-
tive, but statistically insignificant, change in the
interest elasticity. Neither interaction term is in-
dividually statistically significant, and the test
statistic that they are jointly zero, F,,, ,~= 0.91,
is not statistically significant. Therefore, the
hypothesis that financial innovations raised the
interest elasticity of the currency ratio is
rejected.
~J I ~I(~j1T ;%r,
/~4i)j%,lIi~Y IJEN.EitN1l)
The evidence above on financial innovations
influence on total checkable deposit turnover
and the currency ratio rejects the financial in-
novation hypothesis. These results do not ad-
dress the more familiar literature on Ml de-
mand or the velocity problem; nor do they ex-
amine the implications of the financial innova-
tion hypothesis for M2.
Figure 5 shows the income velocity of Ml and
M2 measured by the ratio of nominal gross na-
tional product to Mi and M2, respectively.
Movements in velocity inversely reflect move-
ments in money demand. The velocity of Ml has
a strong positive trend until 1981, while M2
velocity does not appear to have a noticeable
trend either before or after 1981. These velocity
‘°BothHetzel and Mehra (1989) and Judd, Motley and
Trehan (1988) take this view; indeed, the central issue in
the money demand literature, according to these papers,
seems to be, first, whether the recent shifts and instability
of Ml demand are permanent or will disappear after some
transition to a deregulated environment, and second, if the
breakdown in Ml demand is only transitory, whether its
statistical properties will dominate those of M2 demand
when Ml demand “settles down.” Judd, Motley and
Trehan are more optimistic about a return to normal than
Hetzel and Mehra. More recently, Hetzel (1989) and Mehra
(1989) provide arguments intended to reinforce their view.
Carlson and Hem (1980), Hafer (1981) and Tatom (1983a)
report evidence on the breakdown of the M2-GNP link
after 1977. however, Tatom (1983b) and Darby, Poole, of
a!, (1987) provide a fuller treatment of the potential causes
and consequences of the change in the behavior of Ml
velocity.
2lkasche (1988a) extends his 1987 Ml analysis to M2, M3
and broader measures.
patterns often are cited as evidence that the de-
mand for Ml, but not for M2, became less
stable in the early 1980s, supporting the finan-
cial innovations hypothesis.~~
Rasche provides a model of the demand for
Ml and other monetary aggregates, which he
argues has been stable for a long time.” He ex-
plains that the shift in Ml velocity behavior is a
“shift in the drift” attributable to a change in
the systematic components of velocity that are
impounded in the mean of the growth rate
specification or in the trend of the level of ye-
locity.22 Rasche also finds evidence that the in-
terest elasticity of Ml demand rose after 1981.
He argues, however, that the timing of financial
innovations and their purported effect on Mi
demand are inconsistent with the timing of the
“shift in the drift” that he finds. Rasche’s evi-
dence also indicates that the demand for M2
is stable.
In Rasche’s model, money demand, that is,
nominal money per dollar of GNP, depends upon
the interest rate (the three-month Treasury-bill
rate), real income and unanticipated inflation. In
quarterly estimates, real income, x, is measured
by real GNP, and unanticipated inflation, 1”, is
measured by the residuals from an MA1 model
of changes in the annualized continuous rate of
increase of the implicit price deflator for GNP.
The income and interest rate effects on money
demand occur over three quarters.”
An unrestricted version of Rasche’s Ml de-
mand equation, estimated for the period 11/1953
to IV/1989 is:
22This argument rules out shifts in Ml velocity due to
changes in its response to economic factors that deter-
mine it or to changes in the error structure of the random
elements that affect it. These two sources are typically the
basis for claims of increased uncertainty or increased in-
stability in a demand function, Rasche conjectures, how-
ever, that the shift in the drift arises from the decline in in-
flationary expectations or a rise in the instability of the
economy, but he finds no direct evidence supporting these
arguments.
23Several coefficient restrictions are tested in Rasche (1987)
and used in Rasche (1988a, 1988b). These are not impos-
ed here because they could bias the tests of the financial
innovations hypothesis.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To test whether the rise in sli has raised Ml
demand, the variable 400 Asll is added to the
equation. The financial innovations hypothesis
predicts that its coefficient should be significant-
ly positive. When this variable is added to equa-
tion 2, however, its coefficient is negative, but
statistically insignificant, —0.063 (t= —0.58). This
result refutes the financial innovations hypothe-
sis about the effect of the growth of other
checkable deposits on Ml demand.”
To test whether the rise in money market
deposits influenced Ml demand, which the fi-
nancial innovations hypothesis denies, the money
market innovation measure, 400 As21, is added
to the Mi demand equation; the result is:
(3)I~1i,—GNP,= — 1.918 — 0.035[400/3(lnR,—lnR,,)]
(—4.45) (—4.35)








B’ = 0.70 P.W. = 1.91
SE. = 2.636 1’ 0.22
(2.67)
The money market innovations term is signifi-
cantly negative; the introduction and growth of
money market balances has statistically signifi.
cantly reduced Ml demand. The coefficient on
the innovations term is small, however; the rise
in s21 to 1, about its level currently, has re-
duced the demand for Ml by 3.4 percent.
The proportion of MM that are transaction
balances can be estimated from the coefficient
on the innovations variable. The latter coeffi-
cient equals —g/(l+gs2l), where gi sthe share
of transaction balances in MM, according to the
derivation in the appendix to this article (eq.
20). Since the mean level of s21 is 21.85 percent
during the sample period, the estimated average
value of g is 3.4 percent.’6
A skeptic might argue that the significance of
the last two terms in equation 2 actually demon-
strates the validity of the financial innovations
hypothesis. After all, the demand for Mi rose
and its interest elasticity increased, just as the
hypothesis predicted. Rasche’s timing argument
indicates this is a spurious relationship, but more
formal tests are possible. A test of whether the
rise in the interest elasticity is related to the growth
of other checkable deposits rejects this skeptical
view. The term (sl,lnR,—sl,_,lnR,_,) 400/3 re-
lates the shift in the interest elasticity systemati-
cally to the share of other checkable deposits
following the financial innovations hypothesis.
When this innovations-related shift in the in-
terest elasticity is used in place of the post-1981
shift variable P82D1113 in equation 2, its t-stat~
istic is still significant, but lower (—3.44 vs.
—6.07); moreover, the equation’s standard error
rises (2.80 vs. 2.88). When both variables are in-
cluded in equation 2, however, the t-statistic
for the innovations-related shift variable falls to
—1.43, while the t-statistic for D82DR13 re-
mains strongly significant (t= 4.83).”
Similarly, the hypothesis that P82 is a proxy
variable for the sharp rise in other checkable
deposits in the early 1980s is tested by compar-
ing the effect of Ash on equations 2 and 3 with
and without P82. When this is done for equa-
tion 2, the t-statistic for 400 Ash, is —0.10
when P82 is omitted and, as indicated above,
—0.58 when P82 is included. When both are in-
“The absence of an effect of sil on Ml demand implies
that the growth of other checkable deposits is offset, dollar
for dollar, by reductions in M1A (Mi less other checkable
deposits). A similar test of whether no other checkable
deposits should be added to M1A to obtain a stable de~
mand is easily rejected. The proportion of other checkable
deposits that must be added to M1A to obtain an ag-
gregate whose demand is invariant to shifts in other
checkable deposits is not significantly different from 100
percent. This rejects the usefulness of M1A, or at least the
hypothesis that its demand is invariant to financial
innovations.
26When equation 20 in the appendix is estimated with the
same non-innovation variables as in equation 2, the esti-
mate of f, 0.014, is not significantly different from zero
(t=0.l5). The estimate for g, 0.037, however, is statistical~
ly significant (t=2.40).
21These tests were also conducted using equation 3 instead
of equation 2. When both measures are included in the
equation, the shift in the interest elasticity in 1982 remains
strongly significant (t= —5.36), while the si-related interest
elasticity shift is not (t = —1.00). The coefficient (— 0.031)
on the money market innovations term, 400 As2l,, remains
significant in this case (t= —2.12).‘4111
cluded, however, the coefficient on P82 (2.425)
is the same size as in equation 2 and it remains
statistically significant (t=3.32). The use of Ash
and the si-related shift in the interest elasticity,
in place of the i982 constant and interest rate
shifts, also are easily rejected when tested joint-
ly. Thus, the growth of the other checkable
deposits does not account for the significance of
the last two terms in equation 2. Similar results
are obtained when these same substitutions are
made in equation 3 and the significance of the
money market innovations term remains unaf-
fected by these changes.
The Demand for ;%12
The M2 money demand equation that uses the
same set of variables for the same period as the
Mi estimate is:
(4) M2,—GNP,= 1.385 — 0.055 PR13, — 0.734
(3.63) (—7.82) (—7.41)
—0.76ix, + 0.428[400/2(lnx,_, — lnx,_,)I
(—15.95) (5.25)




Unlike the Mi estimate, the M2 estimate sug-
gests that there was no significant shift in the
M2 demand intercept after 198i. The interest
elasticity of M2 demand rose significantly after
1981, however, like that for Ml demand.
The financial innovations hypothesis suggests
that these innovations should have had no ef-
fect on the demand for M2. To test the hypoth-
esis, the same procedure used for Mi was fol-
lowed for M2.” The results indicate that the
contemporaneous rise in the share of money
market balances in M2 (s22) has a statistically
significant effect on the demand for M2, but
that no other financial innovation variable (lags
of s22 or current and up to four lagged values
of s12) has a significant effect. Moreover, when
the contemporaneous share of money market
balances is included in the equation, neither the
intercept shift nor the interest elasticity shift is
statistically significant. The estimate, without the
insignificant variables, is:”
(5) M2,—GNP,=l.422 — 0.052PRh3, — 0,711 P~
(3.55) (—7.73) (—8.29)






The result that the rise in the share of money
market deposits significantly raised the demand
for M2 runs counter to the financial innovations
hypothesis.’°According to the estimate, a2 5
percent share of money market deposits in M2
(nearly its share at the end of 1989) raises M2
demand relative to GNP by about 6.5 percentage
points.31
Figure 6 shows the growth rate of M2 mea-
sured over four-quarter periods since 1978 and
an adjusted growth rate that removes the effect
of shifts in money market funds from M2 using
the estimated effect in equation 532 The money-
25No attempt was made to adjust the T-bill ratd for the
average rate paid on the components of M2 in order to
better measure the opportunity cost of M2. Rasche (l988a)
notes that, in an estimate like equation 4, inferior overall
results were found when such a measure is used instead
of the T-bill rate.
“When D82, and D82,DR13, are added to the estimate they
are not statistically significant; the coefficient on 082, is
— 0.894 (t = —1.39), and that for the shift in the interest
elasticity is -0.033 (t = —1.60).
‘°Theseresults do not depend on the inclusion of the four
quarters that Rasche omits in his study. When these
quarters are omitted, the standard error falls to only 1.926
percent and the other properties of the estimate are nearly
identical. The same results also obtained when all four
quarters of 1983, during which the largest shifts occurred,
are omitted; in particular, the t-statistic for the s22 innova-
tion term is 2.49.
“The theoretical value of the coefficient on 400 As22, is
g,i(l-g, s22), where g, is the proportion of MM balances
that are not close substitutes for the rest of M2. This ex-
pression is derived in the appendix to this article. The
sample estimate of g,, given the sample mean value of
s22 of 5.39 percent, is 25.7 percent. When equation 22 in
the appendix is estimated using the nonlinear least
squares method and with the same other variables as in
either equations 4 or 5, the other checkable deposit in-
novation’s coefficient is not significantly different from
zero, but the money market innovation term is. Using this
method, the trend shift and interest-elasticity shift again
are insignificant when the money market innovation term
is included. For the counterpart to equation 5 in the text,
the nonlinear least squares estimate of g, is nearly the
same, 24.2 percent, (t=5.i7).
~‘Thisadjustment subtracts 0.261 s22, from the logarithm of
M2 to obtain a series that is independent of s22.
p =0.44
(5-75)Figure 6









market-induced shift in M2 demand had the
greatest effect on the measured growth rate in
1983. In other periods, the growth rate of M2
has been affected only slightly. The adjusted
growth rates ranged from 6.3 percent to 9.8
percent from 1980 until 1987. The sharp accel-
eration of M2 growth from 1980 to 1983 and
subsequent slowing can be explained by the ef-
fect of financial innovations, in this case, by the
growth of money market balances.
The effects on M2 velocity are shown in fig-
ure 7. Actual M2 velocity appears to vary about
its mean in figure 7. When adjusted for shifts
arising from money market accounts, however,
M2 velocity has a positive trend, especially since
the mid-1960s.
The financial innovations hypothesis that the
introduction and acceptance of other checkable
deposits, especially NOW and super-N-OW ac-
counts, have seriously, and perhaps permanent-
ly, distorted the measurement and effectiveness
of Ml, but not M2, is widely accepted today.
The counterpart of this hypothesis—that the in-
troduction and growth of money market assets
like money market deposit accounts had no ef-
fects on Mi and M2—is as widely endorsed. A
systematic investigation of this hypothesis,
which focuses on the turnover rate of check-
able deposits, the desired currency-deposit pre-
ferences of money holders, and the velocity or
demand for Mi and M2, however, generally re-
jects its claims.
The financial innovations hypothesis implies
that the turnover of total checkable deposits
and the currency ratio will decline significantly
as the share of other checkable deposits rises.
The analysis here indicates that the turnover of
total checkable deposits was not affected by
these financial innovations. There was a signifi-
1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 1989
‘Current rise from four quarters earlier.Figure 7












cant decline in the currency ratio associated
with the rise in the share of other checkable
deposits in total checkable deposits, but this
significance is spurious in light of its sensitivity
to the omission of only one observation and its
refutation in the other tests presented here.
The introduction and growth of other check-
able deposits has had no significant effect on
the velocity of (demand for) Ml. While there is
evidence of a shift in Ml velocity and its interest
elasticity after 1981, the tests here reject the
financial innovations hypothesis that these shifts
were related to the rise in the share of other
checkable deposits in Ml in the early 1980s.
The introduction of money market deposit ac-
counts and the earlier introduction of money
market mutual funds have had a significant ef-
fect on the demand for monetary aggregates.
The expansive growth of these new balances
has had no effect on the composition of Ml or
the use of checkable deposits. The demand for
Mi, however, was reduced slightly because of
the growth of money market balances. More im-
portant, the growth of these balances was asso-
ciated with a significant rise in the demand for
M2. As a result, M2 velocity was depressed by
the growth of money market balances. Ironically,
this reduction has provided unwarranted sup-
port to the view that MZ velocity is stationary
and M2 demand is stable. Movements in the
share of money market accounts have ac-
counted for much of the variation of M2 growth
over the past 10 years or so.
Proponents of the view that financial innova-
tions have distorted Ml apparently have been
focusing on the wrong innovation. According to
the evidence here, explicit interest-bearing ac-
counts have not affected the use of checkable
deposits, the composition of Ml or the demand
for Mi (or M2 for that matter). Instead, the
growth of money market balances has signifi-
cantly affected the aggregates, raising M2 de-
mand and depressing its velocity. Money market
deposits also appear to provide substitute trans-
action services for Ml, so that their growth has
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The financial innovations hypothesis, as
presented and tested in this paper, states that
the introduction and growth of other checkable
deposits, OCD, distorted the measurement of
both total checkable deposits and Ml, but left
the overall demand for Ma unaffected. More-
over, according to this hypothesis, the introduc-
tion and growth of money market balances (MM)
had no effect on M2. Instead) the growth of
these balances came at the expense of other
non-MI funds within Ma, so that it had no ef-
fect on total checkable deposits, Ml demand, or
the composition of Ml.
The hypothesis suggests that some fraction, f,
of other checkable deposits is not held as total
checkable transaction balances and that money
market deposit balances do not yield transaction
services or are not held as part of total check-
able transaction balances. Thus, the amount of
total checkable deposits. TCLJ, that are “truly”
transaction balances equals (1-fsl) TCD, where
si is the share of other checkable deposits in
total checkable deposits. If some proportion, g,
of MM are also transaction balances, then the
total MM component of transaction balances can
be written as gs2, where sZ is the ratio of MM
to TCD. Total transaction balances, TTB, can be
defined as:
(1) TTB e(i—fsi+gsz) TCD.
In this framework, the financial innovations
hypothesis is that i f>O and g=o.
Prior to financial innovations, si and s2 were
zero and nfl equaled TCD. The effective quan-
tity of Ml was C + TCD, where C is the curren-
cy component of Ml. The effective quantity of
Mi, designated MV, when si and sZ are not
zero, is C+TTI3, or Mi-fOCD+gMM. If sii is
defined to be the ratio (OCD/M1) and s21 is de-
fined to be the ratio (MM/Mi), then
(2) M1* M1(i—fsii +gs2i).
Since Mi equals (1 +k) TCD, where ki sthe
ratio of currency to total checkable deposits,
sli equals si/(1+k) and s21 equals s2/(l+k).
An effective quantity of Ma, called Ma *, can
be defined similarly. Whether or not certain
proportions of OCD and MM balances are ap-
propriately considered part of flB and MV,
they are definitionally part of Ma. This is the
central reason that the hypothesis claims that
~2 is unaffected by these innovations. If, how-
ever, some fraction of these new deposits are
not close substitutes for M2, then the effective
quantity of M2, M2*, should exclude these frac-
tions of the new deposits.
In particular, if some fractions, f, of other
checkable deposits and g, of MM balances, are
held for non.M2*~relatedreasons, then shifts in
holdings of these funds will boost M2 relative to
M2*, that is,
(3) M2~= M2(i —f.s12—g1s22),
where si2 is the ratio of other checkable depos-
its to Ma and s22 is the share of money market
balances in M2. According to the financial in-
novations hypothesis, the growth of other check-
able deposits or MM involves substitutions within
M2 and does not affect its total; therefore, M2
equals M2 and g, and f, equal zero.’
The hypothesis is tested below using the rela-
tionships in equations 1-3. In particular, two im-
portant economic variables, the turnover rate
for total checkable deposits and the currency
ratio, relate debits and currency holdings,
respectively, to desired holdings of checkable
transaction balances. Movements in other check-
able deposits or money market deposits have
predictable or systematic effects on the ratio of
checkable transaction balances to observed total
checkable deposits and, therefore on debits or
currency holdings relative to total checkable
deposits. Similarly, growth in these new assets
affects the relationship of Mi and M2* to their
observed counterparts and, therefore, systemati-
cally affect the relationship of the observed ag-
gregates, Mi and Ma, to the factors that influ-
ence the demands for Ml * and Ma *, respectively.
The hypothesis also suggests that the interest
elasticity of demand for transaction balances,
1Since M2 = (1 ÷k+t)TCD, where t is the ratio of the non-
Ml components of M2 to M2, the ratios s12 and s22 are
simply (1 +k+t)’ times sl and s2, respectively.Mi and M~have been affected by financial in-
novations. The specific form of the hypotheses
and tests are derived below.
/Hff.I/~ ~ I:/:%rrli;2:
The turnover rate for total checkable transac-
tion deposits is the ratio of debits, D, on these
deposits to their total, TTI’B. If v, the turnover
rate of deposits held for transaction purposes is
a function of a vector of variables, z0, then
(4) D = v(z,,)TTB.
Substitution of equation 1 in equation 4 yields:
(5) D = v(z) (1 —fsl +gsa) TCD.
The left-hand side of equation 5 includes any
third-party debits on MM balances held for
third-party payment, i.e., as checkable transac-
tion balances, (gMM). For simplicity, assume that
debits include only third-party payments and
thus exclude cash-withdrawal debits on both
TCD and MM balances. If debits on money
market balances, Dm~are also a function of
gMM and the vector z0 above, or
W) Dm = vm(z0) gsa TCD,
then the debits measured against total checkable
deposits U,, are
(7) U, = = v(z0) [i—fsi+gsad] TCD,
where d = (i-v,,/v) and the turnover ratio for
total checkable deposits is
(8) d = U,/TCU = v(z0)Ei —fsi + gsaoi.
A rise in si reduces the turnover ratio for total
checkable deposits; if f is zero, however, then
movements in si have no effect on v. If g and
vm are not zero, movements of funds into MM
balances (relative to lCD) will affect the turn-
over of total checkable deposits. The sign of this
effect depends on whether 6 is positive, zero or
negative, or whether transaction balances in
MM have relatively low, the same or high turn-
over compared with the weighted average turn-
over of total transaction balances, v.
A log-linear specification of v(z0) is used,
where z0 includes the current and past interest
rate (i, i,,) and real personal income, y,, or
(9) lnv, = /3~+ /3, Ini, + /~2 Ini,.., + /3~Iny,.
The log-linear specification of equation 8 is
(iO) Ind, = /3, + /3, Ini, + ~ lni,_, + /33 Iny,
+ ln(i—fsi + gdsa),
where vm/v is assumed constant. When equation
10 is differenced, the result is:
(ii) AInd, /3 Alni, + /33 Alni,, + /33 Alny,
+ Aln(i —fsi +gdsZ).
The last variable in equation ii is unknown
because f, g and 6 are unknown. This problem
is addressed indirectly in the paper.2 1ff, g and
6 are constants, then




The difference in the logarithm in the last term
in equation ii can be approximated using the
total differential of the expression in paren-
theses and replacing dsl and dsa with Asi and
Thus, equation ii can be written as:
(13) AInd, /3~+ /3, Alni, + /3, Alni,., + /33 Alny,
+ /34 Asi, + /35 Asa,,
2All the estimates in this article contain a term like
Aln(1 —fsl +gds2) in equation 11. Estimating the constants
like f and (gO) directly by non-linear least-squares yields no
differences from the result reported in the text for the
financial innovations hypothesis. If f is correlated with
movements in si or its counterpart measures below, the
estimated coefficient on the share variables would be bias-
ed; if the correlation is positive, as proponents of the
financial innovations might argue, this biases up the coeffi-
cient and biases the tests in favor of the financial innova-
tion hypothesis. The same argument applies to g. The op-
posite bias would arise if f and the other checkable
deposit share were negatively correlated, but this is
counterintuitive. There is no a priori reason to expect f or
g (or f, and g, below) to change, especially to change
systematically with movements in the shares, however.
3The coefficients on Asl and 6s2 involve sl and s2. These
coefficients are estimated as constants and are evaluated
at the sample period average values for f, go, sl and s2.
Note that gO is estimated from the s2 coefficient; conse-
quently, the hypothesis that g equals zero cannot be
tested. If 6 equals zero (the turnover of transaction
balances held in MM is the same as for the rest of such
balances), then the coefficient on s2 will be zero; however,
this does not imply that g is necessarily zero.where /3, is an intercept which should have a trol dummy variable, c. The first-difference of
value of zero, unless a significant time trend has
been omitted from equation 10. Tinder the finan-
cial innovations hypothesis, /34< 0 and /35 = 0.
Ihe hIterest .iiastieitv o the
~Itn’nover Hate
The financial innovations hypothesis tested in
the text implies that the interest elasticity of
money demand rose as a result of financial in-
novations. Since turnover is a velocity measure,
a test is conducted of whether the interest
elasticity of the turnover rate of total checkable
deposits rose in proportion to the growth of si.
In equations 9 and iO, this elasticity is constant
and equals (/3, +fl,). If /3, and /3, are functions of
si, for example, /3, fl~+fl,si, and /~2=(~2’
+ /~2’si,_,, then the terms (/3, mi, + /~2 lni,_,)
in equations 9 and iO must be replaced with
(fi Ini, + /3,’ si, + fi lni,, + /3,’ si,1lni,,). In
equation i3, /3,’ replaces /3k, /~2’replaces fi,
and the additional terms /3,’ A(si,lni,) and
/32’ A(si,,,,lni,.,) must be included. Whether the
interest elasticity rose depends on whether /3,’,
/3,’ and (/3,’+/32’) are statistically significantly
positive.
r~vfjJ/ C’URIU~E/NCYRATIO
The currency ratio is the ratio of currency to
total checkable transaction balances. Currency
demand relative to total checkable transaction
balances is
(14) C = k(z1) TTB,
where z, is a vector of the determinants of the
desired ratio. With the advent of OCD and MM
balances, currency holding competes with all
other transaction-related balances, or TTB. Sub-
stitution of equation 1 in equation 14 yields
(15) C = k(z,) (i —fsi + gsa) TCD.
When si rises, currency demand declines, given
TCD, z,, f and g, if 0<f l. Changes in s2 have
no effect on the currency ratio under the hy-
pothesis that g=o.
The variables in z, that determine the desired
currency ratio, and are controlled for in testing
the financial innovations hypothesis, include the
autoregressive component, a first lag of the cur-
rency ratio, the current (i,) and past (i,_,) in-
the log-linear form of equation is, with the ap-
propriate substitutions for z,, is:
(16) Aln(C/TCD), = 6, + 6, Alni, + 62 Alni,,
where D80 equals Ac.
+ 63 Alnp7 + 64 D80
+ 63 Aln(C/TCD),,
+ Aln(i —fsi + gsa),
The last term on the right-hand-side can be
approximated using the same argument used
above for equations ii and 12 since
dln(i —fsi + gsa) equals V f/(i — fsi +gsz)]dsl
+Eg/(i —fsi + gsa)]dsa. Thus, equation 16 can be
written as:
(17) Aln(C/TCD), = + 6, Alni, + 6,Alni,.,
+ 6,Alnp~+ 64 D80
+ [—f/(i—fsi + gsa)] Asi,
+ [g/(i —fsi +gsa)] Asa,.
The financial innovations hypothesis, 0< ~ 1, is
tested by whether Asi, has a significant negative
coefficient. The hypothesis g = 0i stested by
whether As2, has a significant coefficient.
Whether the interest elasticity of the currency
ratio is affected by the growth of si is also
tested. The sum (6+6,) in equation 16 or 17 is
the interest elasticity of the currency ratio. If
each of these components is a function of si,
then the interest components in k(z,) can be
written as (6 + 6,’si) Ini, + (62’ + 62’ si) lni,_,,
and [6~’+o;+ 6j si, + 62 si,~,]is the interest
elasticity of currency demand in this case. In
the first-difference form given in equation 17,
the interest rate components are replaced with
6 Alni, + 6,’ Alni,_, + 6,’ A(si, lni,)
+ 62’ A(si,_,lni,_,). If financial innovations affect
the interest elasticity, then 6,’ and/or 62’ are
significantly different from zero. Since 6, and 6,
are negative, for the interest elasticity to
become larger in absolute value requires that,
6,’, 6,’ O and (6,’+62’)<0.
~~“i”’
Suppose “true” or effective Ml demand, Mi’,
is a function of a vector of variables z,. Substi-
tuting equation a yields:
(18) (1—fsii +gsai)Mi = D(z2).
In log-linear form, this equation can be re-
terest rate, energy prices, p’, and a credit con- arranged as(19) lnMi = ln[D(z,)] — ln(i —fstl +gsai).
When this is flrst-differenced and a similar
substitution is made for the last term as was
made in equation 13 and 17, the result is:
(20) AlnMi = Aln[D(z)] + 66 Ash,
where
+ 6, Asai,,
66 = f/(i —fsli +gsai), and
67 = —g/(i—fslh+gsai).
For M2 demand, the same set of tests are con-
ducted. In particular, if “true” M2 demand, Ma4
in equation 3, is a function of variables z,, E(z,),
then substituting this in equation 3 yields
(21) (1 —f,siz—g.saa) Ma = E(z,).
In the text, the z, vector includes the same set
of other money demand variables as Mi, that is,
z, equals z,. In differenced log-linear form and
using the exact differential to derive the
discrete Aln(i—f,siag,saa), equation 21 becomes
1ff is zero, then 6~equals 0. If 0<f i,
however, then 66 is positive; that is, a rise in
sli should raise Mi demand, given the variables
in z,. If g equals 0, then 6, equals 0; if g is
positive, then 6, is less than zero.
The variables included in z, are the interest
rate, income and unanticipated inflation. The
specification of ln[D(z,)] also includes a shift in
the interest rate elasticity of money demand
and a shift in the level of Mi demand, where
both shifts occur in 1982. Therefore, tests are
conducted to determine if these two com-
ponents of z, arise from financial innovations.
(22) AInMa, = AIn E(z,) + 6, Asaa, + 69 AsIa,
where
69 = Eg,/(i—f,sia—g,saa)] and
6, = [f,/(1—f,sla—g,saa)].
Under the financial innovations hypothesis, f,,
g,, 6, and 6, are all zero. The coefficients 69
and 6, are positive if the proportions g, of MM
or f, of OCD are positive; this result would in-
dicate that these proportions are not a close
substitute, given z,, for the rest of Ma.